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Langdell's Legacy
Or,
The Case of the Empty Envelope
John Henry Schlegel*
1850s TO
1980s. By Robert B. Stevens. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press. 1983. xvi + 334 pp. $19.95.
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE

THE

HuBy Consultative Group
on Research and Education in Law. Ottawa: The Council. 1983.
ix + 186 pp. No cost.
LAW AND LEARNING: REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND

MANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA.

Let's play a guessing game. We all know that Thorsten Veblen once opined that "the law school belongs in the modem university no more than a school of fencing or dancing."' But who
offered the following observation on law professors:
The setting of a law professor's career is fluid, distracted
and, in some ways, contradictory. It lacks the definition of role
and organized division of labour that enables individuals to find
and choose directions for continuing development, particularly
as researchers. As earlier mentioned, 40% of our respondents
were either planning on leaving law teaching or unsure about
staying. Because of this high rate of staff turnover, those in the
law teaching profession are younger than the average in other
disciplines. It appears that many come and go through the
ranks of the legal professoriate without making the lifelong
commitment to it that has been a precondition of development
and excellence in other disciplines, and without generating role
models to influence new recruits.

Moreover . . . most law

professors are to some extent distracted by other preoccupations; almost 80% reported being engaged in part-time professional work of one kind or another over the past five years.
*

B.A. 1964, Northwestern University;J.D. 1967, University of Chicago; Associate

Dean and Professor of Law, SUNY/Buffalo.
1. T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN
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Despite their relative youth and modest involvement in
scholarship (as traditionally conceived in the universities), law
professors show a remarkable pattern concerning academic
rank. Almost half are full professors, whereas less than a quarter of professors in the humanities or social sciences are full
professors, and only 27% of professors across all fields hold
this rank. The law professors' rapid advancement must be seen
more as a response to their alternative career opportunities
than as a reward for exceptional and widespread academic
achievement.
The touch of social science rules out Duncan Kennedy; 2 is it
Stewart Macaulay? 3 Or, if the voice is too clinical for either of
those, and you are still unsure, try listening to this observation
on legal scholarship.
In this setting research skills are not always extensively developed. Professors may remain relatively unambitious in their research and are clearly not familiar with most research methods
outside the legal library. Furthermore, the survey showed that
their research, independent or commissioned, is directed to a
rather undefined and diverse readership, including practitioners and judges, law reformers and social policy makers, legal
scholars and law students, scholars in other disciplines and the
general public.
Law professors as a group do not appear to be in the grip of
a "publish or perish" syndrome. They seem hard put to find
intellectual inspiration in the legal curriculum, which they feel
attempts to satisfy a host of teaching objectives simultaneously-from turning out competent legal practitioners and providing students with knowledge of the substantive rules of law
to assisting them to be more reflective, analytical and critical in
their work, and to gain greater appreciation of the impact of law
on society.
It is too restrained for Alan Freeman; 4 is it perhaps Roger
Cramton?5 Still baffled? Maybe this summary will help.
Law teaching and research tend to be doctrinal, neglectful of
fundamental theory, and distinctly lacking in interdisciplinary
content and methodological diversity. Professors seem indeed
2. See, e.g., Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc.
ACTION 71 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Macauley, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors: Notes on the Margins of "Professional Training in the Public Interest," 54 VA. L. REV. 617 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 122E
(1981).
5. See, e.g., Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research ant
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221 (1974).
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reasonably content to allow their priorities to be determined by
the real or imagined demands of professional practice.
It is probably too direct for Robert Gordon;6 is it David
Cavers? 7
Tired of guessing? The truth of the matter is that the writer is
not an American at all. It is Harry Arthurs, former Dean at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. And although he is not a
modem day Toqueville, for Arthurs' sobering revelations concem Canadian Legal Scholarship, before one breathes a sigh of
relief, shrugs one's shoulders and comforts oneself with the
thought: "Of course Canadian legal scholarship must be underdeveloped compared to ours," one would do well to review the
development of American legal scholarship as well.
In 1914, Josef Redlich, an Austrian legal scholar who prepared a report on American legal education for the Carnegie
Foundation, delicately observed that the time consumed by the
preparation of casebooks "prevented many forceful writers
among modern American law teachers from cultivating the fields
of legal history and dogmatic literature as fruitfully as they might
otherwise have done."' Lest one think that matters have improved since, one might ponder the recent observation of the
late Robert M. Hutchins, wunderkind Dean at Yale, that based on
fifty years of reading two of the major law reviews, it was apparent that one was unchanged since the twenties and that the other
was only occasionally better. 9 Indeed, although Arthurs is writing about Canadian legal academics, his findings are no less revealing about the American legal academic culture, so dispirited
is the legal academic in this country and so piteously low is the
state of American legal academic scholarship after over one hundred years of "development."
Although no one has yet proposed a convincing explanation
for the sad state of affairs in legal scholarship, two recent books,
Robert Stevens' Law School: Legal Education in America from the
1850's to the 1980's and Arthurs' Law and Learning: Report to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canadaby Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, the source of my
6. See, e.g., Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Cavers, "Skills" and Understanding, I J. LEGAL Enuc. 395 (1949).
8. J. REDLICH, THE COMMON LAw AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSrTY
LAW SCHOOLS 50 (1914).

9. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, in Santa Barbara, California (June 20,
1975).
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earlier quotes,10 suggest some answers.
I.

THE AMERICAN MALAISE

For the past thirteen years, the rule for any scholar concerned
about the history of American legal education since the Civil War
was to begin with Robert Stevens' piece, Two Cheersfor 1870: The
American Law School, 1 and do the rest of the work himself. With
the publication of his latest book, Stevens has assured us that that
rule will apply for the next thirteen, if not thirty, years.
Stevens has expanded and revised his earlier work in light of
years of further research, largely his own. The resulting work is
both thorough and comprehensive; it includes such obscure players as the Northwestern College of Law in Portland, the Freylinghuyse'n University Law School and the Andrew Jackson
Business University Law School, and such equally unheard of
legal academics as John Norton Pomeroy, Alexander Kidd and
Claude Horack. But this is as it should be, for Stevens' book is an
example of that unfashionable form, narrative, institutional history, and in any institutional history, the main character, the hero
as it were, is the institution.
As told by Stevens, the basic story about the institution of
legal academia is now getting to be well known, if not well loved.
Around the time of the Civil War, most lawyers were admitted to
practice after some period of apprenticeship. Then in 1870 came
Christopher Columbus Langdell who discovered, not America,
but the idea of teaching law by means of cases discussed in a dialogic format and who thought that every lawyer should be a college graduate as well as a graduate of a three year, full-time law
school program taught by professional academics. At first, the
bar, in the persona of the American Bar Association, thought that
these two ideas were preposterous. Nevertheless, the "socratic,"
casebook format quickly caught on among a new breed of fulltime, professional law teachers. And in time, fears of the poor in
general, and the immigrant/Jewish poor in particular, led to the
acceptance of Langdell's program of graduate education, which
was justified in the name of "raising standards" for admission to
10.

CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN LAW, LAW AND LEARN-

88-89
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Arthurs, without cross-reference].
11. Stevens, Two Cheersfor 1870: The American Law School, 5 PERSP. Am. Hisr. 405
(1971).
ING: REPORT TO SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA
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the bar. Following this acceptance, the ABA and the Association
of American Law Schools joined forces in a forty year, state by
state campaign to bring Langdell's ideas to fruition. Yet, even
before national uniformity was achieved, serious criticism of
Langdell's model of legal education as repetitive, too long, and
too impractical was heard and proposals for reform proliferated,
although of these only the move toward adding a "clinical" component had any widespread success.
This crude sketch of Stevens' argument is not intended to do
it justice; that would take pages, so rich is his detail. Nor can it
begin to suggest the incredible effort that has been expended in
an attempt, remarkably successful given the difficulty of finding
the necessary source material, to tell this story not from the top
of the legal education pecking order down, as was largely the
case in his work of thirteen years ago, but by a real cross-section
of legal academics and legal academic institutions. 12 The point
of such a crude retelling is to lay bare the outline of Stevens'
story, for this outline is, I think, a most interesting basis from
which to undertake an inquiry into the low state of legal
scholarship.
The outline of Stevens' story can be brought into relief by
posing three questions. Why did Langdell's program of
casebook, private law, graduate education take hold among academics? Why did the bar ever go along with it? Why after the
bar agreed to go along with it, did state legislatures go along with
it also? Stevens spends a good deal of time on the second of
these questions-the bar's response to Langdell's program. In
his explanation, Stevens tries t o steer a course between the economic arguments of Harry First1 3 and the more social arguments
for the bar's acceptance put forth by Jerry Auerbach 14 and Stevens himself.15 First argued that Langdell's program of graduate
education was attractive to legal academics, and thus derivatively
to the bar, because it provided a basis for developing a cartel that
12. I have visions of Neibelung-like hordes of Tulane and Haverford students out
combing the countryside looking for obscure archives, their hammers ringing out, not
"gold" but "law schools," though the thought of the thoroughly Falstaffian Stevens.as
Alberich clearly will not work.
13. See, e.g., First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311
(1978).
14. J. AUERBACH, UNEOUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976).
15. Stevens, supra note 11, at 454-64.
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could, through the mechanism of the Association of American
Law Schools-a classic trade association, limit competition from
profitable non-A.A.L.S. schools. Stevens and Auerbach, with differing emphases, argued that ethnic, religious, and class biases
worked in tandem with the notion, common among progressives
before World War I, that increased "standards" would improve
anything-in this case, the bar. The two arguments are in a sense
congruent, if not intentionally complementary, 16 and Stevens
puts them together.
The resulting, thoroughly balanced presentation is clearly an
improvement upon the earlier work that he draws on, but like all
balanced presentations it fails to confirm any particular explanation. The key unasked question is why anyone thought that the
bar needed "improving." First's implicit answer, "competition,"
strikes me as just wrong.1 7 It ignores, as legal academics then
and now are wont to ignore, the fact that legal education, even
among the members of the A.A.L.S., is a highly differentiated
product. Taken as a whole, law schools do not sell a fungible
"legal education," but rather sort students by social origins into
employment destinations."' Harvard did not and does not compete with Illinois and neither competes with John Marshall. And
even if such competition existed, before World War II the
A.A.L.S. was among the world's most inept cartels; it could
barely keep its own members in line. I find it hard to believe that
the elite of the American bar would have embraced such a shaky
economic vehicle. The supposed economic motive of the elite of
the bar that supported the A.A.L.S. also seems hard to identify.
Cravath does not compete with many graduates of Fordham or
St. Johns. And even if one looks farther down the law firm pecking order, an economic motivation is hard to find. It is true that
the bar screams "too many lawyers" anytime the shoe pinches,
but the shoe didn't pinch particularly tightly at any relevant time
16. First's piece is quite obviously a response to Stevens and Auerbach, as if only
manipulating the market is less offensive than nativism and anti-semitism.
17. The same cannot be said for Magali Larson's superficially similar argument
about professionalization generally. See M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONISM (1977).

R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's TO THE 1980's
189 n.72 (1983) [hereinafter STEVENS] presents a different but related criticism of a part
of First's argument from the one that follows.
18. SeeJ. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR (1982).
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between 1880 and 1928, the years when all of the relevant crucial
alliances were formed.
As for Auerbach's contribution to the joint alternative, I see
no reason to impugn the sincerity of the lawyers in the progressive movement; they really believed that higher standards would
bring improvement to the bar. Still, it is hard to see "reform" as
a serious impulse from a group-lawyers and law professorsthat was on the whole opposed to such bedrock progressive reforms as the initiative, referendum, and recall and was far
enough right politically to consider a law professor at Wisconsin
a radical and not a serious scholar for advocating the effective
regulation of public utility rates. 19
Given the seeming weaknesses of the first two arguments, I
am left with ethnic, religious, and class biases as the dominant
and underemphasized factors in the bar's acceptance of Langdell's program; for the one thing that changed, and changed dramatically in the United States after the Civil War, was the ethnic
and religious composition of its population. It was the move of
Irish, Italians, Poles, and Jews into the bar that needed "improving" out, just as today affirmative action for Blacks and Hispanics
has to avoid compromising "standards" or "academic freedom."' 20 In this matter then, balance seems particularly out of
order unless it is the balance of looking, as no one yet has, at the
possibility that Langdell's program may have held an intellectual
attraction for the bar.
On the third question-why did the state legislatures go along
with the academics and the bar?- Stevens supplies convincing
evidence that the Depression and World War II, with a little help
from the G.I. Bill, did as much or more to kill off marginal, nonelite law schools and thus raise standards by eliminating the
source of opposition to raised standards than did the bar associations and A.A.L.S. working in tandem. But on his first question-why did the academics go for Langdell's program?Stevens does less well. Clearly, as First argues, the academic lawyers, working through the A.A.L.S., tried to set up a cartel and
ultimately succeeded. First may even be right when he claims
that economic motives played a part in forming and maintaining
the cartel. But the cartel, especially if predominantly an eco19. See W. JOHNSON,
(1978).

SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL

CULTURES

20. STEVENS, supra note 17, at 261 n.133.

1524

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1517

nomic entity, could have been built around any plausibly 2cademic programn-and there were many other programs from
which to choose. Two come immediately to mind. Theodore
Dwight, long-time dean at Columbia, had his own program. It
was built around lectures, was supplemented by examinations,
recitations, quizzes, and moots, and was designed for part-time
students, both graduate and undergraduate, who were expected
to take one private law course at a time while simultaneously
clerking. 2 1 And, if one believes that there is some magic to case
study, John Norton Pomroy, who taught first at New York University and then was dean at Hastings,22 created a program that
was also a "case method," and one far more interesting than
Langdell's for it included much public law, some comparative
law, and jurisprudence. Why then did the cartel ignore these alternative models and instead form around Langdell's program?
Stevens struggles hard with this problem. Ultimately, he settles on no single reason but considers as cumulative the prestige
of Harvard; the existence and success of its first generation of
teachers - Keener and Wigmore, for example, who were imbued
with more than a little missionary spirit; the adaptability of the
method to differing ideas about what was to be taught, all the way
from substance to "thinking like a lawyer"; the aura of modem
science that was curiously attached to the idea that to look at real
cases in the classroom and library was to look at specimens of law
under "laboratory" conditions; the ego-enhancing nature of the
law professor's role in the classroom; and the low cost. I am not
yet ready to suggest, as I did earlier, that Stevens is wrong not to
emphasize one of these factors. Once before I confidently attempted a more directly causal explanation, an attempt that was
met more with a universal yawn than with Shavian universal applause.23 Perhaps it is, as Duncan Kennedy often argues, that
there is no necessary connection between Langdell's program
and the rise of the modem law school, so that any "new" program with some "cache" would have worked. And surely it is
21. See Dwight, Columbia College Law School: New York, 1 GREEN BAG 141, 146 (1889);
STAFF OF THE FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL
OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (1955).
22. See T. BARNES, HASTINGS SCHOOL OF LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY (1978).
23. Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor (Oct. 27, 1979) (paper presented at
the Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History, Williamsburg,
Virginia).
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true that such necessary relationship as exists between ideas and
material culture is poorly understood by modern scholars. Still I
am bothered by all this. If Langdell's program were not somehow necessary to the rise of the modern law school, why then
does it seem so impossible to stomp out that program and thus
change the law school?
This question brings us closer, in time at least, to concerns
about the awful state of American legal academics and their
scholarship. And clearly this question is on Stevens' mind. For
nearly a third of his book, he chronicles both the post-war malaise of the American law school-the disengaged students and
faculty, the repetitive, invariable curriculum, the terrible excuses
that pass for scholarship, and the triviality of most reforms-and
also the record of failure of almost all efforts at innovation directed at alleviating that malaise. In an attempt to explain this
dismal record, he details several factors-limited resources, lack
of interest in scholarship by students and practicing lawyers, the
ambivalence of professors toward their role, egalitarianism of
faculties, and the influence of the bar exam-that have led to failure. The list is impressive, yet I wonder whether there isn't
something that holds it all together.
II.

THE CANADIAN MALAISE

A strong suggestion that this list is anything but accidental
can be gleaned from looking at what I have heretofore taken the
liberty of calling Harry Arthurs' book. Law and Learning is a report prepared for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada in an attempt to aid that group to understand
"why applications from the legal academic community for research funds, graduate and leave fellowships, and other programs, did not conform to patterns in other disciplines," 2 4 that
is, why were they so few in number. To answer this question, an
ad hoc group, largely made up of academics and led by Arthurs,
surveyed deans and faculty, reviewed the book and periodical
literature and held regional meetings on legal research in Canada. Law and Learning summarizes the findings of this group.
Now, while Canada is a huge country, it is not a large placethere are only 21 law schools with about 9,500 students and 600
full-time teachers. So while the task that Arthurs' group set out
24. Arthurs, supra note 10, at v.
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to accomplish was substantial, it was not daunting. The resulting
report, together with its four statistical sub-reports, is amazing
both in its thoroughness and in its clarity of presentation. Almost anything one might wish to learn about Canadian legal education can be found in the report. Salaries, library expenses,
contact between English and French faculties, articles written on
criminal procedure, admiralty, and international trade are all included and at the right level of detail. Indeed, one wishes that
the American Bar Foundation had invested its money as wisely.2
The conclusion of Arthurs' study, that the Canadian bar and
law faculties need to support the development of an explicitly academic rather than professional orientation in the law schools,
has, I am told, raised no little furor in Canada. That conclusion
need not detain us right now. More important, for present purposes at least, is the fact that in the course of the report, Arthurs
pens a short history of Canadian legal education in order to set
his facts and figures in place. According to Arthurs, although
university-based law schools were established in the late nineteenth century in Nova Scotia and Quebec, and later in Saskatchewan and Alberta, the full-time faculties of these schools were
miniscule. Elsewhere in Canada one entered the legal profession
by means of an apprenticeship simultaneously supplemented by a
part-time course of lectures and tutorials offered by the local Law
25. The A.B.F.'s study of legal education is a prime example of constriction of
vision through methodological assumptions. The choice of Brigham Young as the primary research site, while understandable, was preposterous. Consider only the possibility of learning something about sex, drugs, alcohol, and the law student culture; any
learning would have been of more interest to the religious authorities than to the law
teachers. Moreover, the notion of a primary research site, attenuated as it became in the
end, is itself another ludicrous artifact of the long discredited, but still very much alive,
notion of the unitary bar. AsJ. Heinz and E. Laumann, supra note 18, graphically illustrate, andJ. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHics: A SURVEY OF THE NEv YORK CrTY BAR (1966) has
shown law is not a yellow-boxed, generic product. Law schools sort by social origin
toward employment destinations; it is as simple and repulsively class bound as that. A
proper research design would have examined phenomena across social class, for the
pressures on a kid at California Western are not the same as those on a kid at Buffalo,
which are not the same those on a kid at Yale. By failing to understand this basic, social
dimension of the law, the entire A.B.F. study has become largely a curio, another small
monument to the silly notion that law (and thus law school) is autonomous from its
social setting. Add to this the decision to collect hard data and subject it to numbercrunching analysis (admittedly a good defense against charges of bias from either the
bar or the academics, but otherwise strange, given our limited understanding of legal
education) and the futility of the entire effort to date becomes apparent. Indeed, I
doubt that even Lester Mazor's penetrating study of casebooks, 'should it ever be finished, and Ron Pipkin's arresting study of law school admissions, will manage to redeem
the project as a whole.
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Society (bar association) and taught mostly by practitioners and a
few full-time teachers. Despite the difference in formal setting,
there was in fact remarkably little difference between these two
kinds of schools in terms of curriculum and intellectual ethos.
Both educational systems were heavily rule-bound, largely lecture, and predominantly attended by individuals without an undergraduate degree. Over a period of about fifteen years after
World War II, law schools throughout Canada broke relatively
free of professional domination where it had existed; university
law schools sprang up where they had not existed before; law
faculties dramatically increased the number of full-time, and decreased the number of part-time, teachers; and electives and
seminars proliferated while the socratic case method and its variants replaced lectures, even to some extent in civil law Quebec.
Then, in the late sixties and early seventies, the story becomes
very familiar. Student enrollment skyrocketed and women began
to be admitted in great numbers, though both trends have since
leveled out. What happened with the faculty I have already
noted-like American legal academics, they became dispirited
and their scholarship marginal. 26 What happened with the students is best explained by what Arthurs has to say about student
reaction to the new curriculum.
Apart from a small group of highly-motivated students, very
few actually seem to have made conscious decisions about how
to take advantage of the new open curriculum. The eclectic nature of the curricular offerings was usually replicated by the student's own eclectic program of study. If there was any
consistent pattern, moreover, it was that most students seemed
for practice or addressed in
to take most courses recommended
27
bar admission programs.
It is as if the Canadian-American border has evaporated. What
seems to have happened is that in merely thirty-five years the
Canadians have recapitulated American developments of over
one hundred years . . . and into the same dead end.

This curious state of affairs begs for some explanation. Surely
there is some good reason that on both sides of the border legal
scholarship is low in volume; narrow in scope; spread evenly
across the map, with variations only in topicality; largely doctrinal; deficient in empirical, historical, and theoretical dimensions;
and unbelievably boring. Surely there is some good reason that
26. See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
27. Arthurs, supra note 10, at 16.
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students on both sides of the border, though offered an incredible smorgasbord of courses, choose the same narrow collection
of bar exam basics and hate them, and that faculty are similarly
dispirited by, and disaffected from, their academic tasks. There
must be some good reason that Arthurs can sound so American
when he observes of Canadian legal scholarship:
In our view, the claims-particularly legitimate claims-of professional training have submerged academic themes and initiative . .

.

.There is a relatively weak academic presence in our

law faculties. Academic courses tend to be poorly subscribed;
academic issues tend to be treated cursorily when they are encountered (or disguised as "practical," to avoid such indignities); academic themes tend to be raised by oblique questions,
comments or references, rather than based on the solid 28bedrock of material that usually supports professional issues.
Just as there must be some good reason that Stevens can sound
so Canadian when of American legal scholarship he observes:
It was still unclear whether scholarship in29 the traditional sense
was entirely appropriate in a law school.
or,

Systematic expositions of substantive law, where they existed,
became primarily the province of practitioners or teachers in
less distinguished schools, if not the province of faceless lawyers working for the commercial publishers. By the 1950s, it
seemed as if the West Publishing Company, Sheppard's Citations, and the Commerce Clearing House Loose Leaf Service
had taken over responsibility for recording and systematizing
doctrine, while the intellectual elite either concentrated on
practice in the law firms or, in the law schools, addressed themselves to articles or casebooks that eschewed underlying conceptual principles.3 0
But just what is that reason?
III.

LAW

AS RULES, AND LANGDELL'S

EMPTY

ENVELOPE

The answer lies in the concern voiced at the beginning of this
piece: the state of legal scholars and their scholarship. In the
course of offering the standard list of reasons for the piteously
low state of Canadian legal research, a list strikingly similar to the
one Stevens offers-money, lack of academic credentials outside
28. Id. at 55.
29. STEVENS, supra note 17, at 264.
30. Id. at 265.
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of law, teaching obligations, professional pressure 3 -Arthurs,
almost casually, offers the following observation:
The principal reason, of course, is that students and their future employers expect that the teaching of law will be, first and
foremost, the transmission-"unadulterated"-of a definitive
body of knowledge on which a practitioner can depend. But is
this definitive body of knowledge a reality or an abstraction?
The law professor is caught in the crux of that question.
The twentieth century has seen, in many disciplines, the
passing of the centuries-old assumption that reality could be reduced to fixed and certain knowledge, which could be explained by demonstrable laws. We now realize that the
expansion of knowledge consists in continually revising and reinterpreting what we know, as new data and new explanations
emerge. The relatively recent term "research" means doing
this purposefully: seeking better understanding through the
rediscovery, the reinterpretation and the revision of current
knowledge.
In general, law professors seem to appreciate that the tendency to equate education with grasping a presumably definitive body of legal rules is a throwback to this earlier but still
commonplace assumption, which missed the essential point of
what being truly well-informed requires. They endorse the
conventional attitude that neglecting research has negative consequences for a profession or, indeed, for society. But they
seem able to do relatively little about these perceptions. The
pressure seems well-nigh irresistible to be "practical," "to stick
to basics," to postpone
3 2 research until some forever-receding,
more propitious time.
It strikes me that buried here is the first approximation of an understanding of why legal academics are so dispirited and their
scholarly estate so low.
Langdell's world, the world of rules, was, I suppose, an exciting one in those early years. There was the enormous job of systematically stating the law, a job that was carried out not just in
treatises but also in casebooks. But when thatjob was done legal
academics in Canada (by the late sixties I surmise) and the
United States (by World War I) faced a terrible problem. There
really wasn't much more to do. The notion at the root of the
Langdellian program, that law is a definable and finite body of
knowledge, meant that the task with which scholars were left
once that body was substantially defined was to monitor the small
31. Id. at 270-78.
32. Arthurs, supra note 10, at 90.
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changes in the law-chronicling, where possible, a new development in eminent domain or a new wrinkle in consideration.
Some did (and do) this necessary"3 and time-consuming work patiently and lovingly, but for most the endeavor was less than exciting. Alternative tasks like those envisioned by Redlich were
theoretically unavailable because of the assumption that law was
a definable body of knowledge. Alternative approaches were
practically unavailable as well because the law teachers, themselves trained within the confines of the traditional Langdellian
model, knew little about law beyond how to parse a case and organize a body of rules. For most teachers, then, scholarship became an episodic endeavor at best and in its place was
substituted the preparation of teaching materials, a task that at
least might simplify the job of teaching and in addition might
provide a place to bury scholarship that was too mundane to publish. Teachers could, of course, restate the law, and they have,
twice now, but the intellectual excitement of such an enterprise
was limited, hence the notoriety of the occasional fighting issues
that turned up in the process-section 90 or section 402A for
example.
From this perspective, other episodes in the history of legal
education in America become more explicable. Realism, beyond
being a political event and the beginning of the introduction of
modern notions of science into legal thought, was important, if
only because it was something for the tired and trapped legal academics to talk about. It relieved the awfulness of staring that
next reporter in the face, just as the Hohfeldian bubble 34 had and
as Hart and Sacks," LSP,3 6 or Law and Economics would. Thus
the oft remarked low level of scholarly activity in law, the great
33. The importance of systematized knowledge of the rules of law for the practicing bar can be, and I suspect is, often underestimated. Ready access to the counters on
which arguments are founded is of real importance to any lawyer who ventures outside
his or her narrow speciality. Those who do the hard work of making this knowledge
available get far too little credit from the academic establishment.
34. A good bibliography for this non-event in the history of legal thought can be
found in Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in AnalyticalJurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 Wis. L. R~v. 975, 989 n.22. The article that started it all is Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
35. A good bibliography for this non-event in the history of legal thought can be
found in Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 128
n.26 (Winter 1974). The book that captures it all is H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

(1958).

36. "Law, Science and Policy" for the uninitiated. Here the basic texts are H.
LASSwELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY
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effort put into teaching and teaching materials, the time and effort put into law reform and commissioned "scholarship" that
accompanies it, are all really symptoms of the same root causethe limited nature of the task of scholarship bequeathed by Langdell to his grandchildren and theirs. The envelope that was to
contain a piece of paper beginning, "I, Christopher Columbus
Langdell, being of sound mind and body.

.

." was empty.

The obvious cure for these debilitating symptoms is to become the thoroughly modem law professor by throwing off
Langdell's legacy and acting on the realization "that the expansion of knowledge consists in continually revising and reinterpreting what we know, as new data and new explanations
emerge." From what Stevens and Arthurs tell us, I doubt
whether that plan of action is as easy as it seems. Realism tried to
act on just that realization with somewhat less than total success.
Indeed, the monumental record of failure of innovation in law
schools since World War II ought to suggest that something
more fundamental is at stake. To discover this fundamental element and so to understand better the problems vexing legal academics and their scholarship, consider again Langdell's legacy.
Langdell's case method was not just tied to an old notion of definable knowledge, but it was also centered on the related notion
that any knowledge to be obtained was about rules. This notion
of law as a rule, of the rule of law, is deeply bred in CanadianAmerican culture. Consider for a moment the following thoroughly commonplace observations on the practice of law:
[K]nowledge of "the law" may not help lawyers very much in
practice. Many lawyers are involved in only a few fields of law
and do not need to know "the law" in all fields (although they
must be able to find it and use it on occasion). And in any given
field of law, much of what has to be done on a daily basis involves following forms or routines, with little recourse to the
legal rules from which they are derived, or it involves the exercise of skills of negotiation, interviewing or advocacy, rather
than of legal analysis. This is not to deny that some lawyers
spend much of their time dealing with "the law" or that most
lawyers spend some time doing so. But the assumption that
"the law" of the textbook or classroom preoccupies practitioners is ill-founded ....

Then consider what gets taught, and especially what gets
(1950), and Lasswell & MacDougal, Legal Education and PublicPolicy: Professional Training
in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943). No adequate bibliography exists.
37. Arthurs, supra note 10, at 51.
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learned because it is tested, in classrooms throughout the land.
How many times have professors heard a colleague say, "No matter how hard I try to teach the theory they never learn it?" Or
consider what actually gets written about in thejournals. Indeed,
I suspect that however fraudulent it may be, however implausible
it is as a principle of action for a sensible lawyer, still the notion
of law as rule is as deep in our culture as motherhood and apple
pie. The clearest illustration of the depth of the cultural equation of law with rule is the reaction of individuals fresh from our
culture; take any group of middle class, first-year law students
and try any approach other than a doctrinal, rule-focused one.
They hate the alternatives because the alternatives undercut the
notion of law as specialized knowledge available only to, and for
sale by, the professional lawyer. That is the identity that they
bring with them to law school, for that is what the culture tells
them law is about. Legal education supports the notion of law as
rule in the classroom and in the journals, in our bones as it were,
just as it supports the notion that the prevailing rules are on the
whole justified, a comforting notion for the bar as well as for the
neophytes whom we train. Thus, I suspect that if one looked in
detail at Canadian-American law schools since World War II, one
would find that but for clinical approaches (which are, even to
this day, so poor a graft that they would surely be sloughed off if
the academics thought that the bar wouldn't mind) innovations
have been successful in direct proportion to how little they undercut the Langdellian legacy-the notion that law is rules to be
found in books and ordered for easy reference and not, incidentally, for sale.
All of this reveals, however, only a partial explanation of the
existing order. The legal academic is trapped. The species is
committed to scholarship dominated by the notion of law as rule
and yet at the same time such scholarship is both a largely completed task and an intellectual anachronism. Dispirited humans
and episodic scholarship are the plausible, if not necessary, results of being placed in such a position. But if that is the result of
choices made back around the turn of the century, why then have
law professors not looked at the empty envelope that is Langdell's legacy and renounced the will? This is simply rephrasing
Stevens' first question-why did the legal academics buy Langdell's way of looking at the world? I have two answers. First, as I
have suggested, Langdell's program resonated with the general
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legal culture and to that extent was a continuation of, and not a
break from, that culture. Revolutionaries do best when their
revolution draws on an available past. Deep down, lawyers, like
the rest of society, believe that law is rules. Consider the real
meaning of the oft-heard comment by the otherwise well-occupied lawyer busy doing law as law is done, "I'm writing a brief.
Boy, it feels good to do some law for a change." But Dwight's
program and Pomroy's too could draw on that deep cultural
meaning, so there must then be a second explanation. I think
Langdell's world was attractive to legal academics because it gave
them a piece of the academic division of labor that no one else
claimed, and gave them a distinctive method, the hallmark of any
modern science, from which they could build a professional identity much as had other academic disciplines like history or economics around the turn of the century. From this perspective,
the choice to renounce Langdell's legacy is an implausible one,
for in so doing the legal academic would renounce his or her own
professional identity. 8 If that conclusion is bothersome, comfort
can be taken from the fact that no one seems to agree with me.
But that is cold comfort, as the securities lawyers say, unless one
can build an alternative answer. If anyone would like to try, I
suggest that they start with Stevens' wonderful, compendious
volume if they are American, or Arthurs' different but equally
wonderful and compendious volume if they are Canadian. Each
is, and for sometime to come will remain, the basic guide to this
and dozens of other questions about legal education, whether
one likes its answers or not.

38. By this assertion I do not mean to suggest that Arthurs' prescription for the
improvement of Canadian, and by inference American, legal scholars or scholarship is
silly, stupid, poorly thought out, or even hopeless. It in some respects parallels one
offered some years ago, see Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA.
L. REV. 637 (1968), and is rather a noble one that ought to be supported wholeheartedly
by anyone who is serious about legal education and legal scholarship. What we pass off
as knowledge about law to our students is indeed criminal, as Karl Llewellyn made clear
years ago. See Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 651 (1935); Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211
(1948). I do, however, think that something substantially less than optimism is called for
when thinking about the potential for success of this prescription. Arthurs' failure to
express the need for long-term determination in pushing the task he presents shows that
he has not fully absorbed the lessons that this book might teach. That is, however, a not
uncommon failing among those who would reform legal education.

